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Introduction
At this moment United Stated Air Force (USAF) Airmen and civilian contractors are controlling the sovereign airspace over two different nations, neither of which is the United States. These two countries of course are Iraq and Afghanistan. Following back-to-back major combat operations in each country, the USAF has found itself in the midst of leading efforts to establish and run an airspace control infrastructure that safely integrates military and civilian aircraft operations. Both countries share a similar history of conflict and instability under an oppressive regime, which in turn caused severe degradation of their respective civil aviation systems. Although the USAF is engaged in similar efforts in each country, this paper takes Afghanistan as a case study in order to analyze the critical role the USAF is playing in stability operations.
As of the writing of this paper, Afghanistan is less than a month away from the official opening of a countrywide area control center (ACC) offering instrument flight rules (IFR) service to all aircraft operating within its borders. 1 This is a significant accomplishment given that Afghanistan has only 13 indigenous air traffic controllers, all of whom are older than 65 years of age. 2 Although they are using a mix of USAF contract and Afghani controllers, this historic event marks a first-ever for the country's rudimentary aviation infrastructure. 3 How they arrived at this point and what future implications the USAF should take from this serve as the focal point of this paper.
To help set the stage, this discussion begins with a brief history of airspace control in 
Background
Joint Publication 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, lists the four notional phases of a joint campaign as deter, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. 4 These phases are commonly referred to as "Phase I" through "Phase IV." An ACA has roles and responsibilities that span all phases. However, the focus of this paper deals with those challenges an ACA faces during the transition phase (Phase IV). For standardization purposes throughout this paper, the transition phase is referred to as "stability operations" to more closely reflect the reality of ongoing operations in Afghanistan.
Whether military or civilian, when an aircraft takes flight it operates under one of two internationally recognized rule sets; visual flight rules (VFR) and instrument flight rules (IFR).
While operating VFR, aircraft fly under see-and-avoid rules, meaning the pilot in command is responsible for his/her own separation from other aircraft and as such is restricted from flying through clouds (or any visually obscuring weather phenomena). Aircraft operating under VFR may or may not be in radio contact with an ATC facility. In contrast, aircraft operating under IFR must be in radio contact with a designated control facility and therefore provided separation from other aircraft while in the control facility's designated airspace. All civilian air carriers operate almost exclusively under IFR due to the increased margin of safety it affords. The fact that Afghanistan will be able to operate an IFR-capable national airspace system marks a significant advancement toward building a modern airspace control infrastructure. The following quote clearly demonstrates COMUSCENTAF's commitment toward that end.
Aviation safety in Afghanistan is one of my greatest concerns and one that I know you share. Along with safety, I also place a high priority on making sure airspace is available to civilian and Coalition military users alike. I trust we share a similar vision for aviation in Afghanistan, a vision that includes an air traffic control system capable of supporting the full spectrum of air operations. Before OEF, the Afghan ATC system could have been described as undeveloped, unregulated and barely functioning. The entire Afghani civil aviation infrastructure consisted of a flight information center (FIC) that serviced the entire country with a workforce of 13 controllers providing basic VFR flight advisory services. 6 In addition to the FIC, a handful of radio operators staffed only a few of the country's 22 airports. 7 None of the airfields had operable navigational aids, airfield lighting of any kind, or radar equipment. 8 Aircraft entering or overflying the country were responsible for seeing and avoiding other aircraft. Aircraft flying between airfields within the country used a common air-to-air frequency to announce their position and progress to other airborne aircraft. Loosely analogous to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Afghanistan's Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism (MOCAT) provided limited oversight of Afghan aviation from its offices located in the country's capital city of Kabul.
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The FIC, also located in Kabul, was established just prior to 1970 to help support the country's growing aviation system. 10 The FIC is a ground-based communications facility operated by air traffic controllers responsible for monitoring all aircraft entering, leaving, and overflying the country. Approximately eight Afghani controllers were trained in the U.S. at the FAA ATC Academy during the 1960s. 11 Upon returning to Afghanistan, the initial eight controllers trained an additional eight personnel. Of the 16 that received training, 13 remain on the job to this day. 12 As an interesting side note, during the Taliban regime, the controller's wages (of roughly 10 US dollars per month) were withheld. However, controllers were forced to continue work to ensure no interruption in the revenue flow generated by overflight fees charged to commercial international air carriers. 13 To understand the current state of Afghanistan's national airspace system, a quick review of its civil aviation sector is also in order. Afghanistan's sole airline, nationally owned, was established in January 1955 as Ariana Airlines. 14 Four World War II surplus aircraft, located in India, were ferried to Afghanistan for use in the upstart airline to provide domestic flights. 15 In 1957, an agreement was negotiated with Pan American World Airways (PanAm) whereby 51%
of Ariana Airlines shares were owned by various parts of the Afghan Government and the remaining 49% was owned by PanAm. 16 As PanAm was helping to develop Ariana, as a national carrier, it was also funding the development of air facilities in the country. Two main airfields built-up during this time were Kandahar and Kabul, which became the only two international airports in the country. 17 
Emergence of an Airspace Control Authority
For the purposes of this paper, it is recognized that ACA is delegated from the respective Combatant Commander. 28 Although the framework of this discussion details the USAF's role, the challenges presented herein are applicable to any service component that may be delegated the responsibilities of an ACA in future conflicts. For OEF, COMUSCENTAF was designated the ACA for Afghanistan by the Commander, U.S. Central Command. 29 The primary role of an ACA is to establish an airspace structure and corresponding command and control architecture to enable the safe employment of airpower. 30 One of the key responsibilities of an ACA is to ensure coordination with civil aviation authorities to ensure deconfliction of military and civilian flight operations. The first formal step toward establishing this coordination was the signing of a three-way Memorandum of Arrangement (MOA) between MOCAT, ICAO, and COMUSCENTAF in February 2002. 31 A key excerpt from the MOA reads as follows:
In order to enhance the safety in civil aviation and to facilitate aviation commerce within Afghanistan, the Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism of Afghanistan and the Combined Forces Airspace Control Authority (ACA) for the Coalition mission in Afghanistan acknowledge that, for an interim and limited period, the ACA will control the airspace within Afghanistan. The ACA will exercise this control for so long as United States military operations require or until such time as the Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism is capable, either independently or through ICAO assistance under appropriate technical co-operation projects, of assuming responsibility for air traffic services and aviation facilities within Afghanistan. 32 
Transition From Military to Civilian Contract Air Traffic Control
In November of 2001, less than one month after the start of OEF, the then COMUSCENTAF, Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley, was already seeking an exit strategy for critical support assets. 33 He turned to the Air Staff for help inquiring what it would take to reconstitute ATC assets deploying into Afghanistan. 34 The impetus behind COMUSCENTAF's question was two-fold: (1) prevent military ATC assets from becoming stuck in a long-term commitment of controlling Afghan skies, and (2) free-up the low-density, high-demand assets for possible future use in Iraq. 
Challenges for an ACA During Stability Operations
Thus far, this paper has presented the history of airspace control in Afghanistan, from its early beginnings to present-day Coalition military operations in support of OEF. The discussion will now transition toward better understanding the challenges faced by an ACA during stability operations. In doing so, five main categories are analyzed: joint doctrine, scope of ACA, historical illustrations, integrating civil and military aircraft operations, and finally outsourcing military ATC in a combat zone.
Current Doctrine

According to Joint Publication 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat
Zone, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) designates the ACA and defines the relationship between the ACA and component commanders. 43 Typically, the JFC will delegate ACA to his Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). The JFC will normally assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of air assets and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air operations. 44 As a reminder, COMUSCENTAF was the delegated ACA for both OEF.
The basic responsibility of an ACA is to establish an airspace control system that enables airpower to meet the JFC's objectives. The scope of an ACA's responsibilities is defined by the JFC and derived from current doctrine and operating practices. Generally, U.S. joint doctrine and operating practices address coordination of airspace command and control between military forces (joint and Coalition) fairly well. In other words, joint doctrine clearly defines ACA roles to support combat operations. In contrast, joint doctrine minimally addresses the role of ACA during stability operations. For example, current doctrine states that an ACA "should provide for integration of the airspace control system with that of the host nation." 45 Doctrine does recognize the importance of coordinating with host nation aviation authorities. However, it fails to address the issue when the civilian infrastructure is non-existent or nonfunctioning.
During the transition to stability operations in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the first main challenge encountered by the ACA was the lack of functioning institutions in either country with which to coordinate aviation issues. Neither country had the infrastructure to oversee the resumption of control of their sovereign airspace. In both cases, COMUSCENTAF exercised his ACA to fill the void using military and civilian contract assets and personnel. In doing so, COMUSCENTAF operated outside the scope of doctrinal guidance by assuming control of all Afghani (and Iraqi) airspace.
Operating Outside the Scope of Airspace Control Authority
Operating outside the scope of doctrinal guidance and current operating practices in
Afghanistan was necessary to ensure military and civil aviation safety. However, doing so in the absence of formal guidance left COMUSCENTAF faced with unique challenges having strategic-level implications. Examining three specific challenges or issues is the next area of discussion. First, a look at overflight fees and how an ACA can directly influence the revenue gained or lost by a nation. The second two items presented take a look at key documents and their associated implications. These include the memorandum of arrangement noted earlier and the Afghan Aeronautical Information Publication.
Commercial international air carriers pay fees to overfly each county on their route of flight. The revenue generated from these overflight fees is ideally supposed to go towards the respective nation's civil aviation structure for maintenance and modernization. However, it is up to each nation how they choose to utilize those funds. For some underdeveloped nations, such as Afghanistan, this type of revenue is the only consistent source available to support their aviation infrastructure. 46 Prior to 9/11, Afghanistan was averaging 120 commercial overflights per day. The adage of "if you build it, they will come," was certainly applicable to Afghanistan's reopened airway system. For example, even though commercial air carriers were now allowed to overfly Afghanistan, they were requesting more altitude blocks to enable more overflights. The The next two issues, which further illustrate the challenges of operating outside the doctrinal scope of ACA, deal with two key documents. One covers the delineation of authority and a second defines Afghan national airspace. As each document is examined, note that COMUSCENTAF authored both documents, in coordination with MOCAT.
As cited earlier, on , an MOA was signed between ICAO, the Interim Government of Afghanistan, and COMUSCENTAF (under his authority as ACA). 53 At the time, all parties agreed that entering into the agreement was practical and necessary to ensure the safety of Coalition and civil aviation. The concept of an 'ACA' is a U.S. military doctrinal term, and not part of civil aviation's vernacular. The simple notion of lacking a common language with the international civil aviation community made initial coordination difficult. Another problem stemmed from the fact the "[the MOA] was being utilized in a manner which reflected an effort by the Afghan government to authorize the ACA to exercise a limited degree of Afghan sovereign authority." "[W]hile the Afghan government has the authority to share its sovereign authority, the ACA does not have independent authority to accept it." 54 Although, taking control of the airspace was necessary, the problem remained that the ACA did not have the independent authority to control civil airspace. 55 If the ACA is required "to control civil airspace in Afghanistan beyond that which is necessary to maximize the effectiveness of combat operations, the authority to negotiate an international agreement in accordance with provisions of DoDD 5530.3 and AFI 51-701 is required." 56 In other words, a new agreement is required necessitating USCENTCOM-level or higher coordination.
The second document to be discussed is Afghanistan's Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). An AIP is a publication "issued by or with the authority of a state, containing aeronautical information of a lasting character essential to air navigation" within that nation. This was a rather challenging position for COMUSCENTAF, in that MOCAT delegated him the responsibility to determine the rules to ensure aviation safety within their nation. However, even MOCAT lacked the resources necessary to enforce the rules set forth in the AIP.
Historical Illustrations: Why Have We Not Learned?
Lessons drawn from previous conflicts, to include successes and failures, generally help to shape how military forces organize, train and equip in preparing for future conflict. For example, the concept of the RAMCC, discussed earlier, actually originated during the Balkans conflict in the mid-1990s. 60 The concept was revived to support stability operations in was contained using airpower. There was little to no need for civil military coordination due to the nature of the 'no fly' zones established in the south and later in the north. In another example, the Bosnian conflict left that country with neither the funds nor the technical expertise to assume control of its sovereign airspace. 61 In this instance, U.S. forces were spared the challenges of rebuilding and running Bosnia's airspace. That responsibility fell to countries in the NATO-led Stabilization Force. 62 Beginning in 1997, when civil air traffic was restored, the French contingent took control of the lower airspace structure (9,000 feet and below) and everything above that fell to Serbian and Croatian air traffic controllers. To this day, Bosnia still lacks the necessary en route radar for regional flight control, a necessary component needed to monitor and control its own airspace. 63 Given these two examples, it is clear that recent conflicts, prior to OEF, have not challenged the role of an ACA (from a USAF perspective) in transitioning to stability operations. The lack of significant challenge during stability operations, prior to OEF/OIF, perhaps explains why joint doctrine minimally addresses airspace control during stability operations.
The Challenges of Integrating Military and Civilian Aircraft Operations
It is now time to explore the fourth main area demonstrating the challenges faced by an city of Kabul; there were no survivors. 66 The Kam Air flight made contact with Kabul Airport asking for permission to land, however permission was denied due to poor weather, which was described as blizzard conditions. 67 Upon attempting to divert to an airfield in Peshawar, Pakistan, the aircraft collided with mountainous terrain at roughly 9,000 feet. 68 In this case, the USAF did not act in a negligent manner with regard to control of this aircraft. For unknown reasons, the aircrew chose to operate at low altitude in instrument meteorological conditions, which is contrary to the directives of the AIP. Nevertheless, the In this instance, the USAF would bear a large degree of culpability. Further complicating the situation would be the fact that contract controllers would have been involved. The challenges of contract controllers in a combat zone, is addressed in the next section.
Issues Associated With Outsourcing ATC in a Combat Zone
Outsourcing is a fact of life for the U.S. military and will likely become more prevalent. 70 The use of contract controllers and equipment in support of OEF has been and continues to be a successful endeavor for COMUSCENTAF. As cited earlier, over 160 controllers, from three service components, were reconstituted. On top of that, AFCAP was able to tap into and provide an ATC skill set not found in the USAF --en route control. 71 When the requirement was established by COMUSCENTAF to provide en route IFR control across the country, AFCAP (through its sub-contractors) took on this pioneering challenge. AFCAP was able to hire mostly retired FAA controllers possessing vast en route center control and management experience. 72 A large benefit to using contract controllers is their time spent on station. Contractors are hired for one-year tours, which affords them the ability to provide greater continuity at each deployed location. 73 Despite the success of outsourcing ATC using AFCAP, it is imperative this experience not lull the USAF into thinking of this as a "silver bullet" solution to possible future shortfalls.
There are issues that the USAF must fully scrutinize regarding the use of contract controllers.
Contractors are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and therefore are not fully accountable to military authority. 74 Take for example the now infamous events that planning considerations before and after major hostilities. 79 However, the guidance is predicated on coordination with host nation aviation officials to deconflict military operations from civil.
Based on the issues examined in this paper, JP 3-52 should be expanded to include those planning considerations that entail dealing with nations that possess underdeveloped or non-existent aviation infrastructures. Along with expanded planning considerations, historical airspace vignettes from Phase IV operations in Afghanistan and Iraq should be added to punctuate the importance of planning for airspace control in stability operations.
The third recommendation involves training. The USAF formal training unit (FTU) for air operation centers (AOC) is located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The curriculum entails a series of related courses designed to provide initial qualification training for the AOC and is focused on teaching students how to utilize systems necessary to produce an ATO and ACO with an emphasis on the command and control of airpower to support a JFC's campaign plan. 80 The
Joint Combat Airspace Manager's course, taught at the FTU, currently does not contain any instruction on airspace management during stability operations. 81 The addition of formal block training, focused on stability operations, would better prepare AOC airspace managers in dealing with the full spectrum of conflict. The training should include familiarization with the international civil aviation agencies, drafting AIPs and MOAs, dealing with host nation aviation officials as well as techniques for safely integrating civil and military air traffic. As a sign of progress, the author has been invited to the FTU to give a briefing on ACA lessons learned during stability operations for OEF/OIF. The briefing is scheduled to be taped and incorporated into future classes. 82 The fourth recommendation presented here involves designating the USAF as the DoD Additionally, the USAF would be responsible for integrating DoS and applicable international agencies into joint and Coalition exercises. This will help exercise planners to develop more robust stability operations scenarios versus treating it as an exercise afterthought. Additionally, these exercises would force planners to think through these scenarios prior to execution as well as provide an important venue for developing relationships with other key agencies.
Conclusion
In summary, this paper examined the issues and challenges faced by COMUSCENTAF while exercising his delegated ACA during stability operations. In doing so, a brief history of Afghanistan ATC and commercial aviation was presented. From there, the events leading up to U.S. forces securing Afghan airspace in support of OEF was explained. Presented next was a description of the transition from military ATC to contingency contract control as well as the stand-up of the nationwide ACC. After the necessary background information was presented, five overarching areas were analyzed to illustrate the unique challenges of an ACA during stability operations. These issues ranged from the difficulties of mixing military and civil air traffic in a combat zone to a look at why current doctrine does not meet current practice. Of the nearly countless issues faced by an ACA during transition to and sustainment of stability operations, the ones presented in this paper were chosen to best illustrate the complexities and the inherent breadth and depth of the issues involved. Finally, four recommendations were offered, ranging from the simple addition of block training to the AOC FTU to assigning the USAF as DoD Executive Agent responsible for tackling these issues across the joint spectrum.
The overall intent of this analysis was to demonstrate the importance of going well beyond "thinking about airspace control in stability operations" to actually training, planning and organizing for it.
In closing, it is important to remember that when the U.S. goes to war, it goes as a nation bringing all its instruments of power to bear upon the enemy. The U.S. does not go to war simply as the DoD. The importance of providing for aviation safety while helping Afghanistan is undeniable. The key lesson for the operational-level commander bearing the burden of ACA in stability operations is this: U.S. military airpower and capabilities are second-to-none and getting better every day. Delivering precision guided munitions at a place and time that achieves desired effects can have tactical, operational or strategic implications. However, running the national airspace structures of a sovereign nation sets squarely in the strategic realm; and getting it right will pay huge dividends toward achieving a better state of peace. 
